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For furnace testing of fire resistant floor and roof assemblies in the U.S., the ASTM E 119 standard 
(and similarly the UL 263 standard) permits two classifications for boundary conditions: 
“restrained” and “unrestrained.” When incorporating tested assemblies into an actual structural 
system, the designer, oftentimes a fire protection or structural engineer, must judge whether a 
“restrained” or “unrestrained” classification is appropriate for the application. It is critical that this 
assumption be carefully considered and understood, as many qualified listings permit a lesser 
thickness of applied fire protection for steel structures (or less concrete cover for concrete 
structures) to achieve a certain fire resistance rating if a “restrained” classification is confirmed, 
as compared to an “unrestrained” classification.  
 
The emerging standardization of structural fire engineering practice in the U.S. will disrupt 
century-long norms in the manner to which structural behavior in fire is addressed. For instance, 
the current edition of the ASCE/SEI 7 standard will greatly impact how designers consider 
restraint. Accordingly, this paper serves as an exposé of the “restrained vs. unrestrained” paradigm 
in terms of its paradoxical nature and its controversial impact on the industry. More importantly, 
potential solutions toward industry rectification are provided for the first time in a contemporary 





For furnace testing of fire resistant floor and roof assemblies in the U.S., the ASTM E 119 standardi 
(Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials) (and similarly the 




“unrestrained.” Many listings in the UL Fire Resistance Directoryiii permit a lesser thickness of 
applied fire protection for steel structures (or less concrete cover for concrete structures) to achieve 
a certain fire resistance rating if the designer can demonstrate that the assembly will be “restrained” 
when it is constructed as part of an actual structural system. Otherwise, the assembly must be 
considered “unrestrained.” Architects and contractors routinely task structural engineers and/or 
fire protection engineers to judge what classification should be assigned, often with pressure to 
select the often less restrictive “restrained” classification. Unlike the U.S., individual fire 
resistance rated assembly listings used in other parts of the world (e.g., Europeiv) do not provide 
differing construction requirements for “restrained” and “unrestrained.” 
 
This paper serves as an exposé of the U.S. “restrained vs unrestrained” paradigm in terms of its 
paradoxical nature and its unintended and potentially harmful impact the industry. More 
importantly, this paper offers potential solutions toward industry rectification of this controversial 
paradigm for the first time in a contemporary study of this paradigm. 
 
 
The Need for Rectification 
 
A structural fire protection design is deemed as adequate if it adheres to prescriptive code 
requirements (referred to as standard fire resistance design), or less commonly if its performance 
is demonstrated by conducting structural analyses at elevated temperatures (referred to as 
structural fire engineering). These two design methods share no qualification metrics that can be 
cross-plotted for comparison purposes. When employing standard fire resistance design, the 
primary qualification metric is fire resistance, expressed in hours. This metric is an artifact of 
standard fire testing, which requires thermal exposure of a mock-up assembly to a standardized 
temperature history, and its rating is judged in accordance with specific acceptance criteria. The 
standardized time-temperature history does not equate to any specific real fire and the acceptance 
criteria are predominantly expressed in thermal, rather than structural, terms. Even in the cases 
where structural terms are used to define a failure condition in this context (e.g., deflection), such 
terms have a very limited relation to actual system structural behavior. Therefore, the metric of 
‘fire resistance’ has little to no correlation to actual structural system performance at elevated 
temperatures. Conversely, evaluation of relevant structural limit states and/or simulation of 
structural system performance is required for structural fire engineering.  
 
In essence, standard fire resistance design is an empirical indexing method and structural fire 
engineering is structural engineering for a specific loading case. Hence, cross-plotting their 
primary qualification metrics is not only inappropriate, but specifically prohibited by new industry 
standards, as discussed herein. Accordingly, the “restrained vs. unrestrained” paradigm within 
standard fire resistance design can be regarded as grossly oversimplified in the vast majority of 
cases, and the true implications of its form may not have been entirely contemplated when first 
introduced. Consequently, this paradigm causes confusion and conflict for designers and building 
authorities alike.  
 
The “restrained vs. unrestrained” paradigm stipulates compatibility between standard fire 




incompatible aspects as contemporarily examined herein. Standard fire resistance design is entirely 
based on furnace testing of isolated structural components and assemblies, relying almost 
exclusively on insulation (or concrete cover) for structural fire protection. Accordingly, the 
intrinsic fire safety of a given structural system is not explicitly evaluated. Also, the anticipated 
in-situ fire conditions are not explicitly evaluated. Rather, a single intense heating exposure (i.e., 
ASTM E119/UL 263 curve) is used to comparatively test isolated small-scale mock-ups to 
generalize the robustness of the protection scheme to severe fire exposure. This approach permits 
relative comparison between assemblies but is largely divorced from actual expected structural 
system performance. Ultimately, the primary intent of this approach is to reduce the heating of 
individual structural components, with the goal of mitigating the risk of structural system failure 
during an uncontrolled fire. In reality, understanding the primary mechanisms that can lead to 
structural failure requires a realistic definition of in-situ temperatures and temperature gradients. 
Thus, the link between the intensity of heating and structural behavior is neither direct nor simplev.  
 
As an alternative to standard fire resistance design, structural fire engineering explicitly evaluates 
the demand and capacity of structural systems under in-situ fire conditions, in a similar manner as 
other design loads are treated in structural engineering practice. Accordingly, structural fire 
engineering explicitly requires the participation of a structural engineer in all casesvi. Within this 
framework, the thermal demand on a fire-exposed structural system can be reduced by means of 
rationally-allocated structural insulation (i.e., membrane protection or direct application methods) 
or control of fuel loads. Also, the capacity of a structural system to endure fire effects can be 
increased by means of reinforcement strengthening/placement/detailing/continuity, increasing slab 
thickness and/or concrete cover, connection enhancements, increasing member size, geometric 
layout modifications, and/or other measures to enhance structural robustness with respect to 
explicit performance objectives. As opposed to the binary “restrained vs. unrestrained” 
classifications in standard fire resistance design, the analysis of structural system response required 
for this alternative approach inherently considers the degree and condition of restraint. 
 
 
Origin of Restraint Classifications 
 
The origin of the “restrained vs. unrestrained” paradigm can be traced to the time period spanning 
from 1966 to 1971; although, the industry seems to have been aware of restraint effects since at 
least 1899vii. The concept of restraint classifications originated when it was formally observed and 
documented that the behavior of structural members and assemblies during a standard fire test can 
be significantly influenced by the end restraint provided by the testing furnace frame. In this 
context, restraint was identified as the combination of reactive moments and forces generated by 
the dead and live loads plus the forces generated by temperature variations in structural members 
during the fire testviii. Restraint was perceived to be generated at the perimeter of the test assembly 
as the result of the method of framing and tolerance of fit in the test furnaceix. 
 
To address the impact of end restraint on the results of standard fire tests of floor and roof 
assemblies, several revisions were proposed to the governing ASTM committee in 1964, 1965, 
1967, 1968, and 1969 for adoption in the ASTM E119 standardx. These proposals stemmed from 




configurations, protection schemes, and temperature conditions varied considerably from test to 
testxi. Development of a varying degree of applied restraint against thermal expansion in standard 
fire tests was assumed to be the main reason for such variationsxii . Additionally, during this time, 
there were debates about the feasibility of simulating realistic restraint within a test furnacexiii. The 
1969 proposed revision received the greatest support from the committee members and was first 
adopted in the 1971 edition of ASTM E119xiv. Apparently, results and observations from fire tests 
performed at Ohio State University with sponsorship from the American Iron and Steel Institute 
(AISI) played a significant role in the success of the 1969 proposal. The Ohio State tests were 
conducted on protected steel beams with both “restrained” and “unrestrained” end conditions 
under the standard time-temperature exposurexv.  
 
The experimental program at Ohio State University involved fire tests of twelve beam-slab 
assemblies with different degrees of composite action (non-composite to fully composite) 
subjected to varying levels of end restraint. The range of end restraint varied from zero to full end-
fixity. Each beam-slab assembly consisted of a 4 in. concrete slab (36 in. wide) cast over a 22 gage 
steel deck and supported by a 12WF27 ASTM A36 steel beam. The steel beam was protected with 
spray-applied insulation. The beam-slab assemblies had a length of approximately 15 ft 
(“restrained” assemblies were about ½ in. shorter). Sliding-and fixed-hinge bearings were used to 
model the end supports of the “unrestrained” assemblies. For “restrained” assemblies, the end 
conditions were modeled using the standard AISC B-Series bolted clip angle connections and 
fully-welded end plate connectionsxvi. Prior to each fire test, point loads were applied at outer 
quarter points of the beam span for each beam-slab assembly. The magnitude of the applied loads 
was calculated to impose design allowable stresses to the beam-slab assemblies. 
 
Several observations were made from the fire tests conducted at Ohio State University that later 
served as the basis for the 1969 proposed revisions to the ASTM E119 standard. The most pertinent 
observation was on the effect of end restraint on the performance of beam-slab assemblies during 
the fire tests. On average, a 25% increase in the level of fire resistance was observed for the 
“restrained” beam-slab assemblies, as compared to “unrestrained” assemblies. This increase was 
attributed to the negative bending moments induced at the beam-ends in the “restrained” beam-
slab assemblies. Specifically, the generated negative bending moments at the beam-ends resulted 
in smaller effective positive bending moments at the mid-span of each assemblyxvii.  
 
The 1969 proposed revisions to the ASTM E119 standard are summarized in Table 1. As indicated 
in Table 1 (left column), restrained classifications were proposed to be defined for two classes of 
structural systems: individual beams and floor/roof assemblies. Also shown in Table 1 (right 
column) are proposals on how to obtain the level of fire resistance for each assembly type. 
Essentially, the 1969 proposed revisions recommend that beam and floor/roof assembly tests be 
performed under restrained conditions, and  unrestrained classifications be derived based on 
application of temperature limitations during restrained tests. Revealingly, this same proposal 
acknowledged that correlating restraint conditions of a furnace test to that present in actual 





Table 1. Restrained Classification for Fire Resistance Ratings of Floor and Roof Assemblies and 
Individual Beams in the 1969 Proposalxix 
 
Fire Endurance Classification For: Obtained or Derived From: 
1. Restrained individual beam Loaded beam test (width no temperature limitations) 
2. Unrestrained individual beam Temperature limitations applied to loaded beam or restrained assembly test 
3. Restrained assembly 
Restrained floor or roof and ceiling assembly test 
(also, main structural members to qualify on basis of 
temperature limitations for at least one hour 
unrestrained) 
4. Unrestrained assembly Temperature limitations applied to restrained assembly test 
 
 
Code Adoption of Restraint Classifications 
 
At the time in which restraint classifications first appeared in ASTM E119, there were three 
predominant model building codes used regionally in the U.S.: (1) the Basic National Building 
Code published by the Building Officials and Code Administrators, International (BOCA), in the 
northeast, (2) the Standard Building Code published by the Southern Building Code Congress, 
International, in the southeast, and (3) the Uniform Building Code (UBC) published by the 
International Conference of Building Officials, in the west. Investigating the history of these 
building codes reveals that the 1970 edition of the BOCA Codexx, the 1970 edition of the UBC 
Codexxi, and the 1969 edition of the Southern Standard Building Codexxii each adopt and reference 
ASTM E119. Beyond these externally pointing references, the adopted buildings codes at the time 
of the revision to ASTM E119 in 1971 offer no explicit guidance on restraint classification, thus 
effectively abdicating the classification. Although an interpretation by BOCA in 1993xxiii clarified 
the need to apply the ASTM E119 criteria to the end conditions (i.e., consideration of furnace 
boundaries), the model building codes remained silent on what specifically constitutes “restrained” 
or “unrestrained” boundary conditions when considering in-situ construction. Complacency 
regarding this issue throughout this time may have been based on a level of comfort with 
transferring the onus of resolving the specific issues onto designers. This became clear as further 
code commentary was developed. 
 
In its first appearance in ASTM E119-71, guidance on restraint classification was provided in an 
appendix to the standard, §A4. This restraint classification guidance remains in an appendix, now 
§X3, and the language remains largely unchanged. To date, ASTM E119 has not provided any 
precise method for defining “restrained” or “unrestrained” conditions for a given fire-rated 
assembly within in-situ construction. However, the standard offers some limited guidance on 
restraint classifications. In the context of testing, §X3.3 notes that “a restrained condition is one in 
which expansion and rotation at the ends and supports of a load carrying test specimen resulting 
from the effects of the fire are resisted by forces external to the test specimen.” Furthermore, §X3.5 
describes restraint in actual building construction as occurring “when the surroundings or 
supporting structure is capable of resisting substantial thermal expansion and rotation throughout 




essentially defined by exclusion. Namely, all conditions that are not considered to be “restrained” 
are considered to be “unrestrained.”  
 
Through the close of the 20th century, the three regional model building codes were abandoned 
and the International Building Code (IBC)xxiv was developed as an amalgamation of the three 
regional codes. Like it’s legacy model building code predecessors, the IBC also references ASTM 
E119 (and similarly UL 263) in §703.2, and provides limited guidance on restraint classification 
in §703.2.3 where it states that “fire-resistance-rated assemblies tested under ASTM E119 or UL 
263 shall not be considered to be restrained unless evidence satisfactory to the building official is 
furnished by the registered design professional showing that the construction qualifies for a 
restrained classification in accordance with ASTM E119 or UL 263.” Thus, the IBC, like its legacy 
model codes, abdicates responsibility for defining restraint for in-situ conditions to designers. 
Further confusion is then added by including a requirement that the registered design professional 
– typically a professional fire or structural engineer – be responsible for providing sufficient 
evidence to the building official in order to qualify an assembly as “restrained.” Figure 1 below 




Figure 1: Code Adoption Timelinexxv 
 
To help fill the void of guidance/prescription in building codes, Underwriter Laboratories (UL) 
publishes a companion guide to UL 263 that provides additional information for fire resistance 
ratings including judgment of restraint, entitled UL 263 (BXUV) Guide Information for Fire 
Resistance Ratings. In §III.15, the guide specifies that “restrained” conditions in 14-ft by 17-ft fire 
test frames built from composite steel and concrete offer an approximate flexural stiffness of 
850,000 kip-in and 700,000 kip-in along their short and long sides, respectively, which is 
significantly higher than that provided by most structural systems. This stiffness remains 
essentially constant throughout a typical fire test because the test frame is insulated from the fire 





It is up to the designer and code authority to determine if an assembly is being used in a 
restrained or unrestrained application, as required by the building code being enforced.   
 
While relevant, the information above does not provide the explicit and quantifiable guidance 
necessary to adequately judge or justify restraint conditions in the context of the prescriptive 
method, no matter the skill or competence of the design professional. In fact, advanced knowledge 
of structural performance under fire exposure may leave a competent designer more confused and 








In a standard furnace test, an assembly is considered “restrained” if it bears directly against the 
edges of the furnace at the outset of the test. The flexural stiffness of furnace framing is very high, 
often much higher than would be expected in a typical structure, and this stiffness remains constant 
throughout the fire test, a condition that is often unrealistic in a fire-loaded structure. If the 
assembly is made of two components (e.g. composite floor beam and concrete slab assembly), 
both components would be in contact with the edges and restrained equally by the furnace framing 
during a “restrained” furnace test. Furthermore, an assembly is considered “unrestrained” when it 
is free to thermally expand without contacting the furnace edges. By this definition, the 
prescriptive definition of “restrained” fails extraordinarily to capture the complexity and variety 
of actual restraint conditions observed in-situ during a fire. 
 
To provide tentative guidance about mapping the prescriptive definition of restraint to actual 
building construction, UL 263 specifies that "floor-ceiling and roof-ceiling assemblies and 
individual beams in buildings should be considered restrained when the surrounding or supporting 
structure is capable of resisting substantial thermal expansion throughout the range of anticipated 
elevated temperatures." However, there is an acknowledged requirement for engineering judgment 
in assessing what constitutes “substantial thermal expansion.” With in-situ construction, the 
restraint conditions of structural components during a fire may be affected by many factors. As a 
result, these conditions may provide any degree of restraint, with most offering intermediate levels 
that likely lie between “resisting substantial thermal expansion” and allowing free thermal 
expansion and rotation. Further, the restraint offered by an assembly’s connections and 
surrounding framing may significantly change during the fire event. Finally, the restraint 
conditions may enhance, but also could degrade, the resulting structural performance in fire. 
Consequently, reliance on such an oversimplified classification system is at best misleading, and 







At the heart of the divergence between in-situ and furnace testing restraint is the definition of 
“failure.” ASTM E119 (and similarly UL 263) establishes acceptance criteria used to determine 
failure of a test assembly. For the integrity of a floor assembly to resist flame passage, the standard 
states “the test specimen shall have sustained the applied load during its classification period 
without developing unexposed surface conditions which will ignite cotton waste.” This criterion 
is identical for “restrained” and “unrestrained” classifications.  Furthermore, the standard specifies 
historically-based temperature thresholds of the structure that shall not be exceeded, and these 
temperature thresholds are also identical for “restrained” and “unrestrained” systems. For 
“unrestrained” floor and roof assemblies, ASTM E119 states that “for test specimens employing 
steel structural members (beams, open-web steel joists, etc.) spaced more than 4 ft (1.2 m) on 
centers, the temperature of the steel structural members shall not have exceeded 1300°F (704°C) 
at any location during the classification period nor shall the average temperature recorded by four 
thermocouples at any section have exceeded 1100°F (593°C) during the classification period.” 
Repeating the exact language and acceptance criteria thresholds for “restrained” assemblies, but 
only changing the period from the “classification period” to the “first hour,” the standard further 
states that “for restrained assembly classifications greater than 1 h, these temperature criteria shall 
apply for a period of one half the classification period of the floor or roof construction or 1 h, 
whichever is the greater.” The change associated with the period can only be interpreted and 
justified in terms of an undefined, but apparently expected, beneficial effect of restraint on 
structural performance during a fire. This implies not only a quantification of the benefit in terms 
of tolerable temperatures, but also that structural behavior within a furnace is representative of the 
actual structural system behavior. There exists no clear evidence supporting either of these 
assumptions. 
 
In addition to temperature thresholds, the confirmation of structural adequacy diverges between 
in-situ and furnace testing. In a furnace test, the test is typically halted when an arbitrary threshold 
is exceeded in deflection or rate of deflection. At that time, it is deemed that the system has failed, 
as the structural component is interpreted as no longer being able to sustain the load. The adopted 
deflection thresholds are essentially arbitrary, as they have no documented meaning outside the 
context of the furnace testing context, and the values selected for these thresholds may influence 
the fire ratingxxvii; however, it is necessary to adopt a limit to define the “end point” of the test. 
Once these limits have been exceeded, there is little point in continuing the test because, on the 
one hand, continuation could endanger the safety of the test equipment and, on the other hand, no 
means of load redistribution is possible since the test is conducted on an isolated structural 
component or assembly. Conversely, in an actual structural system the end conditions of a 
structural component could affect the structural failure mode. While a simply supported beam with 
no restraint could exhibit a failure mode that is qualitatively similar to that of a furnace test, a 
restrained component or assembly part of a structural system may develop secondary load bearing 
or load redistribution mechanisms when undergoing large displacements under fire exposure that 
could dramatically affect its performance and the failure mode, rendering irrelevant the adoption 
of deflection threshold criteria in furnace testing. For instance, a restrained beam may develop 
catenary action provided the end restraints (i.e. connections and supporting framing) are capable 
of supporting the resulting tensile forces. This type of secondary load bearing and load 
redistribution behavior can be highly beneficial to fire performance. In fact, robust structures can 




secondary load redistribution mechanisms that build on structural system behavior to enhance 
performance under fire. The mobilization of these beneficial mechanisms is extremely dependent 
on the restraint conditions of in-situ structural systems; however, these effects are by no means 
realistically captured by “restrained” furnace tests. 
 
In-Situ Restraint Effects  
 
The effects of in-situ restraint on structural components depend on, amongst other things, the 
position of the supports. For instance, for reinforced or prestressed concrete slabs or beams, a 
horizontal axial restraint force may have a positive effect on the fire behavior, provided that the 
line of thrust is below the resultant of the compressive stress block (throughout the fire). Axial 
restraint in horizontal concrete members can also enable compressive membrane action (or 
compression arching) to develop. This secondary load-bearing and load redistribution mechanism 
can enhance the performance of such members, although the efficiency of this secondary action, 
again, depends on the magnitude and location of the restraint to the edges of the memberxxviii.  
 
In an actual composite floor beam and concrete slab assembly, unlike in furnace testing where 
both components would be restrained equally, the beam and slab will generally experience varying 
degrees of axial restraint. This can result in differential longitudinal movement under fire exposure, 
particularly if the structural components are not acting compositely, resulting in potentially 
significant differences in overall performance. Figure 2 illustrates the difference in boundary 
conditions (i.e., restraining spring stiffness) between furnace and in-situ conditions for a composite 








[Each Spring Color Represents a Different Stiffness] 
 
 
Due to the degree and variability of in-situ restraint during a fire event, nonlinearities in the 
response of the structural system at the ends of the component can result, especially when 
considering the behavior of materials at elevated temperatures. For instance, yielding of 
connections in a moment resisting frame would modify the rotational restraint provided at the ends 
of the beam, reducing the overall stiffness significantly and limiting the restraining strength. 
Similarly, geometric nonlinearities (e.g., local and global instabilities, large displacements) can 
affect the stiffness of an assembly’s restraints. For example, considering a floor beam undergoing 
thermal expansion within a structural system, the beam may impose lateral loading on the girder 
and column support points. Depending on the detailing of the support points, thermal expansion 
may or may not be resisted. In fact, the thermally-induced lateral loading may exceed either the 
beam or support capacities resulting in a significant change in restraint. Accordingly, the 
possibility that the restraint thermal forces may jeopardize the surrounding structure must clearly 
be taken into account, as the potential effects could greatly influence the level of performance. For 
instance, in the 2010 fire in the Tour d’Ivoire in Montreux, Switzerland, thermal expansion of 
concrete slabs subjected to the action of two burning cars led to the shear failure of a supporting 
column that was several meters away from the fire source, resulting in collapsexxx. Finally, other 
components framing and supporting a given floor or roof assembly (e.g. girders, column supports, 
surrounding framing beams and/or floor and roof assemblies, etc.) may themselves be subjected 
to heating from the fire, in which case their strength, stiffness, and other physical properties may 
be affected, which, in turn, may generate complex transient interactions at the boundaries of the 
different components and assemblies.  
 
Non-Standard Fire Exposure  
 
The simplification of the fire exposure into a monotonically increasing time-temperature history 
as used for standard furnace testing represents another limitation in the way that restraint is 
considered in standard fire resistance design. Actual building fires consist of a heating phase 
followed by a cooling phase. During the heating phase, heat from the fire increases the temperature 
of the structural elements in a manner that can produce temperature gradients within these 
elements. The increase in bulk temperature corresponds to thermal expansion, while thermal 
gradients can lead to curvature and overall contraction of the elementxxxi. The performance of the 
structural element when restrained is, therefore, captured by the coupled effect of bulk heating and 
temperature gradients. Given that a furnace follows a predefined temperature history, it cannot 
reproduce the variety of fire related temperature gradients. Similarly, cooling is likely to generate 
a reversal of thermal strains (shift from thermal expansion to contraction) that can affect 
connections between componentsxxxii and dramatically redistribute forces in a structural 
systemxxxiii. This effect is also not approximated in the standard furnace test. To resist cooling, 
supports may need to resist thermal contraction forces that aggregate in the structural system and 
through connections. The restraint forces at the end of a structural component under realistic 
temperature histories differ substantially from those experienced during a furnace test. Thus, the 
standard fire test is an ineffective means by which to consider boundary effects given the potential 





Experimental Evidence  
 
Aside from first principles of structural mechanics, a number of published furnace test results 
demonstrate the inadequacy of the prescriptive method’s treatment of restraint. The American 
Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) and AISI funded furnace testing of steel floor assemblies, 
which demonstrated that restraint from the furnace frame provided no fire resistance benefit in the 
specific cases testedxxxiv. This testing resulted in modifications to a specific UL listing (D982). The 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) performed furnace testing of steel trusses 
typical of the World Trade Center (WTC) 1&2 floor constructionxxxv. Contrary to expectations, it 
was found that an “unrestrained” assembly achieved a higher fire resistance rating when compared 
to an equivalent “restrained” assembly. These tests also raised concern about whether furnace tests 
are “scalable” to larger floor systems. More recently, NIST performed localized fire tests on steel 
beams with differing end restraints and found that the presence of restraint, provided through 
double-angle connections, decreased the fire resistance of the beam when compared to the 
unrestrained configurationxxxvi. These results demonstrate that the effect of restraint can vary 
considerably among different structural systems and restraint conditions, and cannot be easily 





Similar to the previously cited and discussed component-level performance testing and research, 
the importance of restraint conditions on the fire performance of building structures has also been 
established by full-scale fire tests such as the Cardington testxxxvii, as well as by analysis of real 
failures, such as the NIST investigation on the WTC 7 collapsexxxviii. These studies, and many 
subsequent analyses, have undoubtedly demonstrated that structural system behavior can differ 
dramatically from isolated member behavior, and that thermal restraint effects often govern much 
of the response of structural systems in fire. However, it is not within the purview of standard fire 
resistance design to consider such behaviors, as declared in 1967xxxix: 
 
If we attempt to develop the fire endurance of a construction system in actual buildings 
under fire conditions we would not obtain a single-valued answer, but rather we would 
have to measure a range of performance levels depending upon methods of structural 
framing existing in a single building as well as the methods of structural framing of any 
and all buildings into which the construction system under consideration could be 
incorporated… 
 
It is the objective of structural fire engineering to quantify structural fire effects by the application 
of scientific and engineering methods. Currently, advanced analysis based on first principles and 
numerical methods is the best option to predict the behavior of structural systems under fire 
exposure. Accordingly, advanced analysis techniques, like finite element analysis (FEA), can be 
used to capture the complex interactions between structural components, including the effects of 
thermal expansion and contraction, the nonlinearities resulting from thermal effects as well as large 




stages of fire development (e.g. heating and cooling). Hence, advanced analysis can be used to 
explicitly account for the transient effect of restraint for the near endless variety of structural 
systems and restraint conditions in their as-built condition. The last two decades have seen major 
advances in the development of advanced analysis software for structural fire engineering along 
with parallel improvements in computational speed and power, making these computational and 
analytical tools instrumental to supporting the emerging practice of structural fire engineering in 
the U.S.xl and elsewhere. 
 
 
Examination of the Ongoing Justification  
 
Realization that the prescriptive method does not – and theoretically cannot – provide adequate 
justification to design professionals to make rational judgments with regard to the “restrained vs. 
unrestrained” paradigm is not new to the building design community. Indeed, both government 
and industry commentators have repeatedly advocated for more comprehensive 
guidance/prescription on the “restrained vs. unrestrained” classification of fire resistant 
assemblies. In the final report on the WTC Investigationxli, NIST recommended (in Group 2, 
Enhanced Fire Endurance of Structures, Recommendation 5) that improvements to the methods 
for fire resistance testing should be evaluated including the “effect of restraining thermal expansion 
(end-restraint conditions) on test results.” A related recommendation was put forth in 2011 as part 
of a workshop that was organized to establish an agenda for the National Fire Research 
Laboratoryxlii. A group recommendation from the workshop dealing with steel structures provided 
a specific view of the issue as follows: 
 
Research should be undertaken to properly characterize the catenary and membrane 
action behavior that currently is poorly captured by the restrained vs. unrestrained 
argument. The group believes that the [paradigm] is meaningless when one looks at the 
system behavior. 
 
A recent article in Structural Engineering Institute’s (SEI) flagship magazine echoes the above 
concernxliii. Also, an official straw poll found that a near unanimous consensus of the ASCE/SEI 
Fire Protection Committee objects to the current paradigm, and the membership advocates for 
designers to make conservative “unrestrained” judgements, eliminating the need for restraint 
evaluation, until the paradigm is fully rectifiedxliv. Lastly, during a recent workshop on the 
“restrained vs. unrestrained” paradigmxlv, the following points were expressed in a majority 
consensus (>70% attendee approval): 
 
• From the code authority perspective, furnace testing standards only provide 
examples/guidance for restraint classifications, so the designer is ultimately responsible for 
such judgments in all cases and circumstances. 
 
• From the fire testing standards authority perspective, the boundary conditions of the test 
furnace should be clearly described and considered when making a judgment on restraint 





• From the academic perspective, restraint conditions of a furnace test can virtually always 
be expected to differ from those of the in-situ structural system. 
 
• From the design professional perspective, although consideration of restraint is a common 
task in the industry, designers are concerned about the potential liability associated with 
making these judgments in the absence of clear and quantifiable guidance.  
 
Historically and currently, restraint classification in U.S. building codes and their referenced 
standards remains, in both theory and practice, essentially undefined. Some guidance is provided; 
however, this is insufficient to ensure uniform application across a range of assemblies and in-situ 
conditions. The need for additional guidance thus remains.  
 
In light of this ongoing dilemma, some American industry interest groups such as AISI and AISC, 
continue to advocate that all typical steel construction should be rated as restrainedxlvi based on  
limited supporting researchxlvii for this rationale, in the opinion of the authors of this paper. The 
justification appears to be primarily based on the observance of (typically) beneficial compressive 
membrane action during furnace testing, which can act to limit member deflections and achieve 
higher fire resistance ratings. However, it is known that any compressive membrane action 
achieved by in-situ structural systems tends to break down during the early stages of heating, and 
that floors are more likely to act as tensile membranes thereafter, assuming adequate support and 
continuity is provided by the surrounding framingxlviii. This is particularly pertinent for floors with 
realistic structural spans, as compared with the comparatively short typical spans of 14 ft. or 17 ft. 
used in furnace testing. This declarative rationale also extends to the consideration of concrete 
structures in which all spans and conditions are routinely considered to be “restrained” and 
corresponding lower concrete cover requirements are applied. In terms of prestressed concrete, 
this can be particularly problematic, especially for assemblies that are susceptible to heat-induced 
explosive cover spalling. Consequently, the level of applied fire protection (or concrete cover) 
provided to components and assemblies is routinely reduced based upon these declarations, and 
not upon actual judgement of the registered design professional. Giving the dearth of full-scale 
concrete tests available to support this rational, it appears difficult to defend full reliance on the 
presumed beneficial effects of restraint in real construction. However, many design professionals 
routinely follow such declarations without protest for convenience and expediency. Unfortunately, 
those designers that choose not to (e.g., those with more advanced knowledge of structural 
behavior under fire exposure) are easily subject to perceptions by other project stakeholders as 
being obstructionist or over-conservative. Hence, many well-informed designers are often placed 
in a quite precarious position in this respect.  
 
The “restrained vs. unrestrained” paradigm is deeply entrenched in standard fire resistance design 
due, in part, to the evolution of the ASTM committee that maintains the contemporary ASTM 
E119 standard. When ASTM as a body began, changes to standards were relatively straight-
forward, and transparent within the public record (all meeting minutes can be readily obtained in 
historical transactions). In the early days, the committee membership overseeing the ASTM E119 
standard consisted of less than 20 representatives, primarily of professional societal and insurance 
background. In general, few material manufactures were represented on the committee when it 




were largely from the concrete industry and expressed that the committee could be at risk of being 
regarded as a trade organization. For example, Robert Lesley (arguably the founder of the Portland 
Cement Association (PCA)) advocated the following at the committee’s first attempt to 
standardize fire resistance testingxlix:  
 
…The American Society for Testing Materials with its committees stands for fair play for 
all materials having common use and a common purpose, and we do not want the 
specifications that go to the public to be questioned as being influenced by cement men, 
by concrete men, or by men in any other form of industry or trade. This is a broad 
scientific body, and not a trade organization.  
 
As the standard fire test became enforced and listings began to be codified, the make-up of the 
committee evolved and changed. Various material representatives from across the construction 
industry joined the committee with what appears to be commercial interests as a key motivator. 
For example, the following was proclaimed at the timel: 
 
Manufacturers (need to) know the resistance periods of their materials and increase them 
if possible. [Financial] Competition must be met on the basis of performance in tests.   
 
Presently, the materials industries are well represented in the ASTM committee that maintains the 
ASTM E119 standard.  
 
 
Contrary Industry Advances 
 
The current edition of the ASCE/SEI 7 standardli (Minimum Design Loads and Associated Criteria 
for Buildings and Other Structures) permits designers to use structural fire engineering as an 
alternative to the code-default prescriptive method. Specifically, Section 1.3.7 states that structural 
fire protection shall be provided in accordance with prescriptive requirements of the applicable 
building code, or by employing a performance-based approach in accordance with the new 
Appendix E section per building authority approval. This standard crystallizes the fact that there 
is little or no correlation between assembly performance in a furnace test and in-situ structural 
system performance under fire exposure. Accordingly, the standard prohibits designers from 
intermingling aspects of the prescriptive method with structural fire engineering. For instance, 
Section CE.2 warns that standard fire testing does “not provide the information needed to predict 
the actual performance of a structural system during structural design fires.” 
 
ASCE/SEI 7 also addresses thermal restraint more directly/explicitly than preceding U.S. 
codes/standards. Notably, Sections E.2 and CE.6 state that the “level of restraint depends on the 
adjacent framing and connection details,” which are excluded from standard fire testing, and that 
“thermal restraint may dominate the behavior of framing systems, particularly floor systems, with 
degradation of stiffness and strength a secondary factor.” Further, it is stated that thermal restraint 
“may generate forces sufficient to cause yielding or fracture, depending on the temperature reached 
and the degree of restraint provided by the surrounding structural system to the thermally-induced 




behavior than a relatively unrestrained condition with all else being equal, and that thermal 
restraint conditions encompass many more than two distinct scenarios (i.e., “restrained” or 
“unrestrained”).  
 
Effectively, Appendix E brings structural engineers into the fold of structural fire protection design 
as integral participants when alternatives to the prescriptive method are sought by project 
stakeholders. Notably, the inclusion of Appendix E in ASCE/SEI 7 marks the first time that fire 
effects are required to be considered explicitly as a design load condition in a U.S. structural 
engineering standardlii. As a supplement to Appendix E, ASCE/SEI has recently released a new 
Manual of Practice No. 138liii (MOP-138: Structural Fire Engineering). Similar to ASCE/SEI 7, 
MOP-138 prohibits designers from intermingling aspects of the standard fire resistance design 
(prescriptive method) with structural fire engineeringliv. Notably, Section 7.2.1 states that 
“designers should analyze the level of restraint from adjacent structural framing that would resist 
the thermal expansion of a heated assembly or subsystem and not extrapolate standard fire test 
results to evaluate the restraint condition of a structural system.” Further, Section 2.2.1 states that: 
 
Binary restraint classification may be difficult (or even paradoxical) for a designer to 
judge with relation to in-situ conditions considering the incompatible aspects of standard 
fire resistance design and structural fire engineering. 
 
MOP-138 Section 7.2.1 further states that “designers should not use standard fire test results for 
evaluating the restraint condition” of an assembly as part of a structural system. If design industry 
consensus is sought on the “restrained vs. unrestrained” paradigm, the standardized language 
above should leave little open to interpretation in terms of consensus from designers. However, 
building codes continue to make reference to the “restrained” and “unrestrained” qualifications 
included in the UL Directory and other similar sources for fire resistant assemblies since such 
provisions are generally reliant on these references.  
 
ASCE/SEI guidance supports structural engineers who wish to undertake rational design in the 
field of structural fire protection. Furthermore, building officials now have tools to 
comprehensively evaluate structural fire protection varianceslv. It is the authors’ joint opinion that 
the new ASCE/SEI guidance should influence building officials’ interpretation and enforcement 
of restraint classifications within standard fire resistance design. Also, it is the authors’ hope that 
advanced knowledge of structural system performance under fire exposure will no longer be 





There exists an unavoidable conflict between the boundary conditions and general limitations of 
standard furnace testing and the ability of such a method to represent realistic structural system 
behavior under fire exposure. ASCE/SEI 7 and ASCE/SEI Manual of Practice No. 138 highlight 
this conflict, and both express that “restrained” as stipulated by the “restrained vs. unrestrained” 
paradigm in the U.S. is a condition that does not practically exist outside of a test furnacelvi. Hence, 




as “restrained” is not based on applying the scientific method or on their engineering knowledge 
and understanding, but rather on endorsing a demonstrated fallacy – troublingly with the backing 
of their professional credentials/stamp. This is unfair to design professionals, especially those who 
understand the relevant aspects discussed above. Consequently, the “restrained vs. unrestrained” 
paradigm continues to frustrate some design professionals, and many remain conflicted between 
their ethical duties as a registered and licensed professional to base their judgments on code 
prescriptions or engineering principles, and stakeholder pressures to reduce cost and avoid 
deviation from “normal practice,” which actually varies based on jurisdiction in the U.S. The 
“restrained vs. unrestrained” paradigm sets design professionals up for failure by definition and 
does not necessarily improve the fire safety of buildings as compared to an environment in which 
such a requirement for classification does not exist.  
 
In the authors’ opinion, the current prescriptive provision in the U.S. permitting a lesser amount 
of applied fire protection for steel structures (or concrete cover for concrete structures) for a 
“restrained” assembly should be discarded. At a practical level, the “restrained vs. unrestrained” 
paradigm’s reliance on a design professional’s judgment is highly problematic. At a scientific 
level, the prescriptive provision is not supported by relevant experimental evidence or analytical 
reasoning. Fundamentally, the paradigm conflicts with the overarching philosophy clearly 
conveyed by new industry standardization, which prohibits the selective adoption and/or 
intermingling of aspects of the prescriptive method and structural fire engineering.  
 
Similar to most other aspects of the prescriptive approach, an industry-consensus prescription on 
the matter within the building code and the ASTM E119 standard (and similarly UL 263) would 
relieve design professionals of an unrealistic obligation to assess in-situ restraint in the absence of 
an actionable, quantifiable, documented definition. However, it should be noted that, even if 
defined, such a prescription would be entirely arbitrary and not based upon any postulation of 
actual structural system performance under fire exposure. In essence, it would serve as an another 
empirical indexing measure that designers could uniformly reference and apply, solving the issue 
of consistent application, but being otherwise divorced from realistic expectations of structural 
system performance.  
 
As an alternative to an explicit prescription, the “restrained vs. unrestrained” paradigm could be 
entirely abandoned. In this case, the industry would need to obtain a consensus on whether fire 
resistance listings, which are dependent upon this paradigm, would default to current “restrained” 
specifications (typically less insulation thickness for steel structures or concrete cover for concrete 
structures), current “unrestrained” specifications, or some type of compromise between the two. If 
a compromise is proposed, competing interest groups should be included in the discussion (e.g., 
the steel industry and the applied fire protection industry) to promote a balanced approach. Such 
measures would require the next edition of the UL Directory to be comprehensively revised in this 
respect. 
 
At an absolute minimum and in the short term, it is the authors’ opinion that a specific statement 
should be added to the next edition of the ASTM E119 standard (and similarly UL 263) that 
explicitly warns users of the limitations of the “restrained” interpretation and the lack of an 




disclaimer has been implemented for the standard fire time-temperature curve in the past, so it is 
a reasonable short-term goal founded upon past precedent. A statement of this kind would likely 
catalyze dialogue within ASTM and the wider fire safety industry. However, the authors do not 
believe this measure alone would properly rectify the paradigm since it would have minimal 
impact on industry practice without enforcing efforts or an official change in the standard’s 
procedure. Nonetheless, it would mark a clear start toward proper rectification. 
 
As evidenced above, there is a demonstrated need for ASTM (and similarly UL) to take an active 
role in explicitly defining what specifically constitutes an in-situ “restrained” condition or 
abolishing the interpretation entirely. The authors’ joint preference would be for the latter. In the 
absence of their action, it is the position of the authors that designers should refrain from specifying 
“restrained” listings entirely. In this unfortunate case, the design community would need to self-
regulate in the midst of inaction from the originating party of this paradigm and hold its peers 
accountable (e.g. by means of third-party review). Accordingly, designers would default to 
specification of “unrestrained” listings which is deemed as conservative by building codes. 
Promisingly, the conditions for reform are improving as industry advancements and education in 




i ASTM E119 (2016). E119-16a Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials, ASTM 
International, West Conshohocken, PA. 
ii ANSI/UL 263 (2011) Standard for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials, Underwriters Laboratories, 
Northbrook, IL. 
iii UL Fire Resistance Directory, Underwriters Laboratories, Northbrook, IL, 2015 
iv EN 1361-1: Fire Resistance Tests – Part 1: General Requirements, British Standards Institution (BSI), 2012 
v Torero, J., Law, A., Maluk, C., Defining the Thermal Boundary Condition for Protective Structures in Fire, 
Engineering Structures, 149, 104-112, 2017. 
vi Recommended Minimum Technical Core Competencies for the Practice of Fire Protection Engineering, Society of 
Fire Protection Engineers, Bethesda, Maryland, 2018. 
vii Abraham L. A., Himmelwright’s Testimony, Report of the Special Committee of the Assembly, Appointed to 
Investigate the Public Offices and Departments of the City of New York. Albany: James B. Lyon, 1900 
viii Bletzacker, R. W. “Effect of Structural Restraint on the Fire Resistance of Protected Steel Beam Floor and Roof 
Assemblies,” Final Report EES 246/266, Building Research Laboratory, The Ohio State University, Sept. 1966. 
ix Bletzacker, R.W. “Building Frames-Effect on Fire Resistance of Floor and Ceiling Assemblies,” Fire Technology, 
Vol 2, No. 1, Feb., 1966, pp. 15-23. 
x Bono, J.A. “New Criteria for Fire Endurance Tests,” Fire Test Performance, ASTM STP 464, American Society for 
Testing and Materials, 1970, pp. 106-128. 
xi Pearce, N.S. and Stanzak, W.W. “Load and Fire Test Data on Steel-Supported Floor Assemblies,” Symposium on 
Fire Test Methods-Restraint & Smoke 1966, ASTM STP 422, American Society for Testing and Materials, 1967, pp. 
5-20. 
xii Selvaggio, S. and Carlson, C.C. "Effect of Restraint on Fire Resistance of Prestressed Concrete," Symposium on 
Fire Test Methods 1962, ASTM STP 344, American Society for Testing and Materials, 1963, pp. 91-115. 
xiii Selvaggio, S.L.; Carlson, C.C. “Restraint in Fire Tests of Concrete Floors and Roofs,” Symposium on Fire Test 
Methods – Restraint & Smoke, ASTM STP 422, American Society of Testing and Materials, 1967. 
xiv ASTM E119 (1971). E119-71 Standard Test Methods of Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials, ASTM 
International, West Conshohocken, PA. 
 




                                                                                                                                                       
xv Bletzacker, R.W. “Fire Resistance of Protected Steel Beam Floor and Roof Assemblies as Affected by Structural 
Restraint,” Symposium on Fire Test Methods-Restraint & Smoke 1966, ASTM STP 422, American Society for Testing 
and Materials, 1967, pp. 63-90. 
xvi Bletzacker, R.W. “Building Frames-Effect on Fire Resistance of Floor and Ceiling Assemblies,” Fire Technology, 
Vol 2, No. 1, Feb., 1966, pp. 15-23. 
xvii Bletzacker, R.W. “Fire Resistance of Protected Steel Beam Floor and Roof Assemblies as Affected by Structural 
Restraint,” Symposium on Fire Test Methods-Restraint & Smoke 1966, ASTM STP 422, American Society for Testing 
and Materials, 1967, pp. 63-90. 
xviii Bono, J.A. “New Criteria for Fire Endurance Tests,” Fire Test Performance, ASTM STP 464, American Society 
for Testing and Materials, 1970, pp. 106-128. 
xix Bono, J.A. “New Criteria for Fire Endurance Tests,” Fire Test Performance, ASTM STP 464, American Society for 
Testing and Materials, 1970, pp. 106-128. 
xx The BOCA Basic Building Code, Building Officials & Code Administrators International, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1970. 
xxi Uniform Building Code (UBC), International Conference of Building Officials, Whittier, CA, 1970. 
xxii Southern Standard Building Code, Southern Building Code Congress, Birmingham, AL, 1969. 
xxiii The BOCA Basic Building Code, Building Officials & Code Administrators International, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1993 
xxiv International Building Code (IBC), International Code Council (ICC), Washington, DC, 2018. 
xxv Jones, C., 2019 (created figure). 
xxvi Jonsson, J. “Are You A Competent Practitioner,” SFPE Europe, Q1, Issue 13, Society of Fire Protection Engineers, 
Bethesda, Maryland, 2019 
xxvii Dumont, F., Wellens, E., Gernay, T., Franssen, J.M. (2016). Loadbearing capacity criteria in fire resistance testing. 
Materials and Structures, 49(11), 4565-4581. 
xxviii Moss, P. J., Dhakal, R. P., Wang, G., & Buchanan, A. H. (2008). The Fire Behaviour of Multi-Bay, Two-Way 
Reinforced Concrete Slabs. Engineering Structures, 30(12), 3566-3573. 
xxix LaMalva, K.J., Chorlton, B., 2019 (created figure). 
xxx Burnier, O. (2011). Reconstitution de l’incendie de deux voitures dans le parking de la Tour d’Ivoire à Montreux, 
le 9 décembre 2010, Travail de diplôme, heig-vd ed., Yverdon-les-Bains. 
xxxi Usmani, A.; Rotter, J.; Lamont, S.; Sanad, A.; Gillie, M., Fundamental Principles of Structural Behaviour Under 
Thermal Effects. Fire Safety Journal, 36, 721-744, 2001 
xxxii Garlock, M. E., Selamet, S. (2010). Modeling and Behavior of Steel Plate Connections Subject to Various Fire 
Scenarios. Journal of Structural Engineering, 136(7), 897-906. 
xxxiii Gernay, T., Gamba, A. (2018). Progressive Collapse Triggered by Fire Induced Column Loss: Detrimental Effect 
of Thermal Forces. Engineering Structures, 172, 483-496. 
xxxiv C.J. Carter, F. Alfawakhiri, “Restrained or Unrestrained?” Modern Steel Construction, Chicago, IL, September 
2013 
xxxv Gross, J., Hervey, F., Izydorek, M., Mammoser, J., Treadway, J. (2005). Fire Resistance Tests of Floor Truss 
Systems. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster, NIST NCSTAR. 
xxxvi Ramesh, S., Seif, M., & Choe, L. (2017, November). Localized Fire Tests on Steel Beams with Different End 
Restraints. In The 9th International Symposium on Steel Structures. 
xxxvii Lennon, T., Moore, D. B., Bailey, C. (1999). The Behaviour of Full-Scale Steel-Framed Buildings Subjected to 
Compartment Fires. The Structural Engineer, 77(8), 15-21. 
xxxviii Gann, Richard G. (2008). Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center Building 7, Federal Building and 
Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster (NIST NCSTAR 1A). No. National Construction Safety 
Team Act Reports (NIST NCSTAR). 
xxxix Bletzacker, R.W. “Fire Resistance of Protected Steel Beam Floor and Roof Assemblies as Affected by Structural 
Restraint,” Symposium on Fire Test Methods-Restraint & Smoke 1966, ASTM STP 422, American Society for Testing 
and Materials, 1967, pp. 63-90. 
xl LaMalva, K.J., “Developments in Structural Fire Protection Design – A U.S. Perspective,” The Structural Engineer, 
Vol. 96, Issue 1. 
xli NIST NCSTAR 1, “Final Report of the National Construction Safety Team on the Collapse of the World Trade 





                                                                                                                                                       
xlii Almand, K.H, “Structural Fire Resistance Experimental Research – Priority Needs of U.S. Industry”, Prepared for 
the Engineering Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology. 
xliii LaMalva, K.; McAllister, T.; Bisby, L., “Restrained vs. Unrestrained: Within the Context of New Industry 
Guidance,” STRUCTURE Magazine, September 2018 
xliv E-mail from LaMalva, K. to ASCE/SEI Fire Protection Committee Members dated 13 December 2016 (results of 
official straw poll). 
xlv LaMalva, K., “Reexamination of Restrained vs. Unrestrained,” FPE Extra, Issue #20, Society of Fire Protection 
Engineers, August 2017. 
xlvi Carter, Charles J.; Alfawakhiri, Farid, “Restrained or Unrestrained?” Modern Steel Construction, September 2013. 
xlvii Gewain, Richard G.; Troup, Emile W., “Restrained Fire Resistance Ratings in Structural Steel Buidlings,” 
Engineering Journal, Second Quarter, 2001. 
xlviii Bisby, L., Gales, J., and Maluk, C. A Contemporary Review of Large-scale Non Standard Structural Fire Testing. 
Fire Science Reviews. 2(1): 27, 2013 
xlix ASTM Proceedings, Volume 7, Committee P - Fire Minutes, 1907 
l Foster, H. Significance of the Standard Fire Test to Heavy Clay Products Manufacture, Annual Meeting, American 
Ceramic Society, February 1929 
li ASCE/SEI 7: Minimum Design Loads and Associated Criteria for Buildings and Other Structures, American Society 
of Civil Engineers: Structural Engineering Institute, Reston, VA, 2016 
lii Post, N. “Guidance for Structural Fire Engineering Making Its Debut,” Engineering New Record, New York, NY, 
February 2017 
liii ASCE/SEI Manual of Practice No. 138: Structural Fire Engineering, American Society of Civil Engineers: Structural 
Engineering Institute, Reston, VA, 2018 
liv Jonsson, J. “SFPE Core Competencies: Why Do We Need Them,” Fire Protection Engineering Magazine, Q1, 
Society of Fire Protection Engineers, Bethesda, Maryland, 2019 
lv Post, N. “Fanning the Flames for Structural Fire Engineering,” Engineering News Record, New York, NY, January 
2018. 
lvi LaMalva, K.J.; McAllister, T.; Bisby, L., “Restrained vs. Unrestrained: Within the Context of New Industry 
Guidance,” STRUCTURE Magazine, September 2018. 
lvii CPF Grant #04-18. Advancing Performance-Based Structural Fire Engineering Design in the U.S. through 
Exemplar Procedural Guidance, Charles Pankow Foundation, Vancouver, WA, 2018 < 
https://www.pankowfoundation.org/projects/advancing-performance-based-structural-fire-engineering-design-in-
the-u-s-through-exemplar-procedural-guidance/> 
